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Abstract
This paper measures the pass-through of trade costs into U.S. import prices by using ac-
tual data on duties/tari¤s and freight-related costs. The key innovation is to decompose the
indirect e¤ects of trade costs (on prices) into the e¤ects on markups, quality and productivity
while measuring/interpreting the pass-through of trade costs into welfare. Robust to the con-
sideration of variable versus constant markups, there is evidence for incomplete pass-through,
mostly due to the negative indirect e¤ects of trade costs on marginal costs, suggesting that
lower trade costs are associated with imports that have higher marginal costs; markups are
a¤ected relatively less. When the e¤ects of trade costs on marginal costs are further de-
composed into their components, the positive contribution of quality dominates in all cases,
followed by the negative e¤ects of productivity, suggesting that lower trade costs are associated
with higher-quality imports that have been produced with lower productivity.
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1 Introduction
Trade costs are partly determined by trade policy, and, thus, their reection in the welfare of
economic agents through prices (i.e., the pass-through of trade costs) is of political interest. Ac-
cordingly, the empirical literature on international trade has focused on the e¤ects of changes in
trade costs on export prices (of rms or source countries), referring to the gains from trade through
export-oriented growth, especially by relying on dramatic liberalizations of trade for identication
purposes.1 Nevertheless, evidence on pass-through of trade costs to import prices is limited, which
is important for import competition as well as household welfare in the destination country.2
Although calculating the pass-through of trade costs into import prices is straightforward when
the corresponding data are available, calculating the underlying details is the key to form trade
policy, because, other than the direct e¤ects of trade costs on import prices, one has to consider
their indirect e¤ects through other components of prices, namely markups and marginal costs, where
the latter also includes information on quality and productivity (in the source country). As a simple
example, if more liberal trade leads to an increase in import prices due to an increase in quality, this
may be welfare improving in the importer country (depending on the trade-o¤ between increased
prices and quality), while an increase in import prices due to a reduction in productivity (with no
quality e¤ects) would be welfare worsening. Therefore, in a typical welfare analysis of an importer
country, the pass-through of trade costs to prices should be controlled for markup e¤ects as well as
quality and productivity e¤ects.
1The following papers have such investigations based on several case studies: Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994),
Krishna and Mitra (1998), Kim (2000), Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Konings, et al (2005), Badinger (2007), De
Loecker, et al (2012).
2An earlier study by Feenstra (1989) is an exception that focuses on the e¤ects of tari¤s on U.S. prices of Japanese
cars. Recent studies by Porto (2006), Nicita (2009), and Marchand (2012) have investigated the e¤ects of tari¤s on
household welfare using demographic data, focusing on Argentina, Mexico, and India, respectively.
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This paper achieves such an investigation by decomposing the U.S. import prices (measured at
the U.S. dock) into marginal costs, markups and trade costs at the HTS 10-digit good level. Marginal
costs are further decomposed into quality, productivity, and other factors. Using a demand-side
model, for robustness, we consider both variable and constant markups in our investigation. After
controlling for several xed e¤ects, we estimate the pass-through of trade costs to prices, markups,
marginal costs, quality, and productivity. We also distinguish between the e¤ects of duties and
freight-related costs. Moreover, we use actual data on duties and freight-related costs to construct
multiplicative trade costs; hence, our results are robust to alternative specications of trade costs
(such as additive trade costs).
When data for prices and trade costs are available (as in this paper), the main issue is the
measurement of variables such as markups and marginal costs of production where the latter can
further be decomposed into quality, productivity, and other factors (e.g., other local production
costs). This paper introduces a new methodology for the identication of all of these variables.
In particular, rst, the price elasticity of demand is estimated using data on quantities and prices,
where the estimation methodology of Feenstra (1994), which is robust to simultaneity bias, is used.
Second, the estimated price elasticities are used to calculate markups, where we consider the cases
of both variable markups (due to constant absolute risk aversion utility function of importers)
and constant markups (due to constant relative risk aversion utility function of importers). Third,
marginal costs of production are identied by using the data on prices and trade costs together with
estimated markups. Fourth, quality measures are identied as the importer preference parameters
(i.e., demand shifters) that are calculated by controlling the quantities traded for the e¤ects of prices
and other control variables (i.e., good-and-time xed e¤ects). Sixth, since measures of quality and
marginal costs of production are shown to be positively related in the literature (as in a study by
Crozet et al., 2012 who use pure data on quality), the relationship between the estimated measures
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of quality and marginal costs of production is tested by running a regression where all other factors
are controlled for; the part of the marginal costs of production that cannot be explained either by
quality or other factors is dened as the inverse of productivity. Once these variables are identied,
we continue with investigating their interaction with trade costs.
The results of pass-through analyses show that the elasticity of U.S. import prices with respect
to overall trade costs (i.e., duties/tari¤s plus freight-related costs) is about  0:90%. During an
episode of reducing trade costs, under the assumptions of variable (constant) markups, this elasticity
of  0:90% would correspond to a 0:90% increase in prices that is decomposed into 1:74% (1:90%)
of an increase in marginal costs of production, 0:16% (0:00%) of an increase in markups and 1:00%
(1:00%) of a reduction in trade costs (i.e., dened as direct e¤ects of trade costs). The increase
in the marginal costs of production 1:74% (1:90%) is further decomposed into 1:10% (1:20%) of
an increase in quality, and 0:63% (0:70%) of a decrease in productivity for the cases of variable
(constant) markups. Therefore, the contribution of quality has the lions share in explaining the
e¤ects of trade costs on prices, followed by productivity e¤ects and markups.
Considering import competition and/or household utility, if we accept the inverse of import
prices controlled for quality as a rough measure of welfare, 1% of a reduction in trade costs would re-
sult in 0:20% (0:30%) of an increase in welfare under the assumption of variable (constant) markups.
When we decompose trade costs into duties/tari¤s and freight-related costs, such values change as
 0:21 (0:75) for duties/tari¤s and 0:25 (0:22) for freight-related costs, under the assumption of vari-
able (constant) markups. These results show the importance of considering alternative measures of
trade costs in pass-through calculations where freight-related costs play an important role, which
is mostly ignored in the corresponding literature focusing on duties/tari¤s.
The empirical results of this paper regarding the positive relation between tari¤s and produc-
tivity are consistent with the existing literature (e.g., see Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007;
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and Topalova and Khandelwal 2011, for rm-level studies within countries, and Romalis, 2007,
for a cross-country analysis). In terms of the data set and control variables employed, this paper
has similarities with a study by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) who nd that lower trade costs are
associated with quality upgrading for products close to the world quality frontier, whereas lower
trade costs discourage quality upgrading for products distant from the frontier. In this paper, when
the e¤ects of overall trade costs (i.e., duties/tari¤s plus freight-related costs) are considered, in the
case of a reduction in trade costs, the results are in line with quality upgrading on average across
products, which is consistent with studies such as by Hart (1983) who argues that competition will
reduce managerial slack. However, when the e¤ects of only duties/tari¤s are considered (in this
paper), in the case of a reduction in trade costs, the results are in line with quality downgrading on
average across products, which is consistent with studies such as by Schumpeter (1943) who sug-
gests that the appropriability e¤ect would reduce incentives to innovate. Despite the consistency
of the empirical results of this paper with the existing literature, however, none of the mentioned
papers have considered the separate e¤ects of duties/tari¤s and freight-related costs on prices. Most
importantly, these papers have not decomposed the e¤ects of trade costs (on prices) into the e¤ects
on markups, quality and productivity while measuring/interpreting the pass-through of trade costs
into welfare. This paper bridges these gaps.
In the following section, we introduce the data and estimate the tari¤ pass-through into prices;
this section will also motivate the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we introduce the model that
distinguishes between variable and constant markups. The implications of the model are estimated
in Section 4 to identify markups, marginal costs, quality, and productivity. The pass-through of
tari¤s to the components of prices is depicted in Section 5. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 6.
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2 Data
The U.S. imports data are from the US. International Trade Commission (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/)
covering imports from 220 source countries at the HTS 10-digit good level between 1996-2012. The
data set includes (i) customs value (quantity times price charged by exporters) measured at the dock
of the source country, (ii) quantity traded, (iii) general import charges in values (i.e., the aggregate
cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges incurred, excluding U.S. import duties), and (iv)
calculated duties in values (i.e., the estimated import duties collected based on the applicable rates
of duty as shown in the Harmonized Tari¤ Schedule).
We calculate import prices by dividing the sum of customs value, general import charges and
calculated duties by the quantity traded. Overall trade costs in multiplicative terms are calculated
by dividing the sum of general import charges and calculated duties by the customs value; this cal-
culation methodology e¤ectively converts any type of trade costs (either additive or multiplicative)
into multiplicative terms. Overall trade costs are decomposed into duties/tari¤s and freight-related
costs; duties/tari¤s are calculated by dividing the calculated duties by the customs value, while
freight-related costs are calculated by dividing the general import charges by the customs value.
The descriptive statistics on trade costs are given in Appendix Table A.1 at the sectoral level. As
is evident, mean duties have reduced about 1.1%, while mean CIF measures have reduced by 0.68%
between 1996 and 2012.
We consider a balanced panel (i.e., the number of goods and source countries are the same
across time) to have a consistent comparison across goods and source countries through time; this
strategy makes our estimations robust to the product replacement bias, similar to what Nakamura
and Steinsson (2012) have shown in the context of price indexes. In order to control for outliers, we
further lter the data by ignoring price observations that have coe¢ cient of variation (i.e., standard
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deviation over mean) above one over time. This has left us with a decent number (18; 360 =
1; 080 17) of observations, including data from 499 goods and 64 source countries. Hence, in the
nal data set used, although each good/country pair has data for 17 years, the number of goods
considered di¤er across countries.3
Since understanding the e¤ects of trade costs is the main interest in this paper, we need to under-
stand their characteristics rst. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of both duties and freight-related
costs (Cost, Insurance and Freight; CIF) across goods and/or source countries for 1996 and 2012.
As is evident, trade costs are heterogeneous across goods and countries through time. Therefore,
understanding the pass-through of trade costs to prices requires a micro-level investigation that
controls for this heterogeneity. Accordingly, we would like to understand the pass-through of trade
costs to U.S. import prices by estimating the following specication:
log pgs;t = 
p
 log 
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + 
g;p
s;t (1)
where pgs;t is the price of good g imported from country s, and 
g
s;t represents (gross) trade costs.
Since prices may get a¤ected by many other factors, we control for time-xed e¤ects t, good-xed
e¤ects g, source-xed e¤ects s, together with good-time-xed e¤ects 
g
t (to capture the market
dynamics for each good) and source-time-xed e¤ects (to capture macroeconomic dynamics of each
source country, including exchange rate pass-through). In this specication, if there are only direct
e¤ects of trade costs on prices, p would take a value of 1.
4 However, the opposite of this argument
is not true; i.e., if p would take a value of 1, we cannot say that there are only direct e¤ects of trade
3After the estimation is done and the parameters/variables are identied, in order to control for outliers in the
sample, mostly due to using unit prices as measures of prices, we ignore the estimates of price elasticities and markups
that are below and above the 3rd and 97th percentile of the corresponding distributions.
4It is important to emphasize that direct e¤ects of trade costs on prices taking a value of 1 is just a denition in
this paper. For sure, there may be many other channels that may lead to direct e¤ects ot rade costs on prices taking
a value di¤erent from 1; e,g, the demand conditions or the share of U.S. in the worldwide sales of the exporter rm
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costs on prices. The reason is simple: Since prices have components other than trade costs, namely
marginal costs of production and markups, when p = 1, we cannot know whether this one-to-one
relation between trade costs and prices is due to the direct e¤ects of trade costs on prices or due
to the e¤ects of trade costs on marginal costs of production and markups cancelling each other
out. This is why we will conduct a formal investigation, below, by decomposing prices into their
components and analyze the e¤ects of trade costs on each component.
Before moving to the components of prices, the results of the estimation of Equation 1 are
given in Table 1 where we distinguish between the e¤ects of duties and freight-related costs (i.e.,
CIF) as measures of trade costs. As is evident, considering the statistically signicant p estimates
of 1.21 and 1.13, a reduction in duties (over time and/or across goods/countries) is related to a
bigger reduction in prices, on average, across goods and countries through time. These estimates
are consistent with Feenstra (1989) who has estimated p values ranging between 0.57 and 1.39
using data on U.S. import prices of Japanese cars, trucks, and motorcycles, although our results
are based on a much wider variety of goods and source countries. However, since the estimates of
both 1.21 and 1.13 are not statistically di¤erent from 1 according their condence intervals given
in brackets, either there are only direct e¤ects of duties on prices or the e¤ects of duties on other
components of prices cancel each other out.
When freight-related costs are considered in Table 1, p estimates are signicantly below zero,
justifying our distinction between the e¤ects of duties and freight-related costs. In particular, a
reduction in freight-related costs are associated with increasing prices, suggesting that marginal
costs of production and/or markups paid on U.S. imports would also increase after a reduction in
freight-related costs; the results are very similar when overall trade costs (duties plus freight-related
may be associated with imperfect pass-through. However, such calculations are out of the scope of this paper due to
the lack of corresponding data.
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costs) are considered. Therefore, there are indirect e¤ects of trade costs on prices through marginal
costs and/or markups.
Accordingly, there are two main hypotheses to be tested. First, if markups are positively related
to trade costs (i.e., if markups decrease after a reduction in trade costs), this may be due to increasing
competition among exporters (i.e., pro-competitive e¤ects) or vice versa. Second, if marginal costs
are negatively (positively) related to trade costs, this may be due to (i) an increase (a decrease)
in the quality of the goods imported after more liberal trade, or (ii) a decrease (increase) in the
productivity distribution of exporters. For testing these hypotheses, we need to identify marginal
costs of production, markups, quality, and productivity, which we achieve by decomposing prices into
their components, below. Since this identication depends on the modeling strategy, for robustness,
we consider both variable and constant markups in our investigation in the next section.
3 Model
The multi-good partial-equilibrium model is characterized by a unique U.S. importer consum-
ing/optimizing imports from a nite number of exporters. Each exporter maximizes its prots
by following a pricing-to-market strategy. Since we do not have/use any production data, to keep
the model as simple as possible, we only focus on the trade implications of having constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion form (CRRA) utility functions, which
correspond to variable and constant markups, respectively.5
5See Behrens and Murata (2007) who formally show the connection between CARA (CRRA) and variable (con-
stant) markups. Also see Yilmazkuday (2013) who has investigated the e¤ects of considering constant versus variable
markups on the Law of One Price in a cross-country analysis.
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3.1 Importers
We model the utility of the U.S. importer at the good level to avoid any further assumptions
for aggregation across goods. Accordingly, the U.S. importer has the following utility U gt out of
consuming varieties of good g at time t coming from di¤erent source countries, each denoted by s :
U gt =
X
s
gs;t

1  e gqgs;t

in the case of CARA (2)
and
U gt =
X
s
gs;t
 
qgs;t
1 g
in the case of CRRA (3)
where qgs;t is the quantity of products imported from country s, p
g
s;t is the price of q
g
s;t at the
destination (i.e., in the U.S.), g > 0 represents a good-g-specic parameter (to be connected to the
price elasticity of demand, below), and gs;t represents a source-good-time-specic quality parameter
that follows a random walk in log-linear terms according to:
gs;t = 
g
s;t 1 exp
 
vg;s;t

(4)
where vg;s;t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance 
2
.
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Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint given by:
X
s
pgs;tq
g
s;t = E
g
t (5)
where Egt is the total expenditure of on good g, results in the following demand function in the case
6It is important to emphasize that gs;ts may also be capturing tastes in utility. Nevertheless, we will test the
relation between marginal costs and gs;ts, below, and show that they have a positive and statistically signicant
relation. Under a supplementary assumption of constant returns to scale in production (i.e., marginal costs not
depending on the quantity produced through demand shifters), having a statistically signicant relation between
marginal costs and gs;ts conrms our specication. Having a quality measure di¤erent from unit values is also in
line with Khandelwal (2010) who shows that using unit values as a proxy for quality would lead to biased results.
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of CARA:
qgs;t =
0BBB@
Egt   1g
X
s0
ln

g
s0;t
pg
s0;t

pgs0;tX
s0
pgs0;t
1CCCA  ln
 
pgs;t

g
+
ln
 
gs;t

g
(6)
and the following demand function in the case of CRRA:
qgs;t = E
g
t

gs;t
pgs;t
 1
g
0@X
s0
 
gs0;t
 1
g 
pgs0;t
 1 g
g
1A 1 (7)
According to these demand functions, after assuming that individual source countries have
negligible impact on the U.S. price aggregates, the (absolute value of) price elasticity of demand
"gs;t can be obtained as follows for CARA:
"gs;t =  
pgs;t
qgs;t
@qgs;t
@pgs;t
=
1
gqgs;t
(8)
and as follows for CRRA:
"gs;t =  
pgs;t
qgs;t
@qgs;t
@pgs;t
=
1
g
(9)
3.2 Exporters
Considering the demand functions given by Equations 6 and 7, each source/exporter country s
follows a pricing-to-market strategy by maximizing the prot out of sales to the U.S.:
gs;t = q
g
s;t
 
pgs;t   cgs;t

(10)
where cgs;t is the source-and-good-specic marginal cost in country s at time t. We further assume
that marginal costs are further given by:
cgs;t = w
g
s;t
g
s;t (11)
where wgs;t represents marginal cost of production measured at the dock of the source country, and
 gs;t represents (gross) multiplicative trade costs capturing duties/tari¤s and freight-related costs.
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Both wgs;t and 
g
s;t follow random walks in log-linear terms according to:
wgs;t = w
g
s;t 1 exp
 
vg;ws;t

(12)
and
 gs;t = 
g
s;t 1 exp
 
vg;s;t

(13)
where vg;ws;t and v
g;
s;t are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and variance 
2
w and 
2
 .
The prot maximization problem results in the following pricing strategy under CARA utility:
pgs;t = c
g
s;t
g
s;t =
cgs;t
1  gqgs;t
(14)
where markups denoted by gs;t are variable (i.e., they change with the quantity sold), and the
following strategy under CRRA utility:
pgs;t = c
g
s;t
g
s;t =
cgs;t
1  g (15)
where markups are constant (i.e., they do not change with the quantity sold).
4 Estimation
This section depicts the details of estimating trade and destination-price implications of the CARA
and CRRA cases. The main objective is to estimate markups (using an estimation methodology
that is robust to simultaneity bias) to further use them in identifying marginal costs of production
and quality parameters which will be important for calculating the pass-through of trade costs to
these variables.
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4.1 Equations to be Estimated
Trade/quantity in the case of CARA given by Equation 6 is already in the following lin-log format:
qgs;t =
0BBB@
Egt   1g
X
s0
ln

g
s0;t
pg
s0;t

pgs0;tX
s0
pgs0;t
1CCCA
| {z }
Good-and-Time-Fixed E¤ects
  ln
 
pgs;t

g| {z }
Price E¤ects
+
ln
 
gs;t

g| {z }
Quality/Taste
(16)
while trade/quantity in the case of CRRA given by Equation 7 can be rewritten in a log-linear
format as follows:
ln
 
qgs;t

= ln
0@Egt
0@X
s0
 
gs0;t
 1
g 
pgs0;t
 1 g
g
1A 11A
| {z }
Good-and-Time-Fixed E¤ects
  ln
 
pgs;t

g| {z }
Price E¤ects
+
ln
 
gs;t

g| {z }
Quality/Taste
(17)
where expressions are very similar to each other except for the dependent variables.
The price equation can be written in log-linear terms as follows, for both CARA and CRRA
cases:
ln pgs;t = ln c
g
s;t + ln
g
s;t = lnw
g
s;t + ln 
g
s;t + ln
g
s;t (18)
where the only di¤erence between the cases of CARA and CRRA will be due to the determination
of markups and thus the decomposition of marginal costs versus markups, because we already have
data for prices, pgs;t, and trade costs, 
g
s;t.
4.2 Estimation Methodology
Since we have a possible simultaneity problem due to estimating quantity and price expressions,
we will follow the estimation methodology in Feenstra (1994) that is robust to simultaneity bias.7
Accordingly, for each good, after taking the rst di¤erence (with respect to time, to be denoted
7Alternatively, as in Yilmazkuday (2013), trade equations can be estimated by putting additional structure (e.g.,
source-and-time xed e¤ects) on quality parameters. However, we avoid such assumptions/restrictions here by using
the methodology in Feenstra (1994).
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by ), we will express estimated equations in relative terms (between source countries s and s0)
by considering the di¤erence in quantities and prices. Such a strategy results in the following
trade/quantity equation:
fqgs;t =  fpgs;tg + g;qs;t (19)
where
fqgs;t = qgs;t   qgs0;t for CARA (20)
fqgs;t = ln  qgs;t  ln  qgs0;t for CRRA
fpgs;t = ln  pgs;t  ln  pgs0;t for CARA and CRRA
g;qs;t =
vg;s;t   vg;s0;t
g
for CARA and CRRA
and the following price equation:
fpgs;t = fgs;t + g;ps;t (21)
where
fgs;t  gfqgs;t for CARA (22)
fgs;t = 0 for CRRA
g;ps;t = v
g;w
s;t   vg;ws0;t + vg;s;t   vg;s0;t for CARA and CRRA
where the approximation in the rst line is due to ln (1 + x)  x.8 Estimation can be achieved
since g;qds and 
g;p
ds are independent; recall that v
g;
s;t , v
g;w
s;t and v
g;
s;t are i.i.d. shocks. In particular, the
independence of g;qds and 
g;p
ds is used to obtain:
g;qs;t 
g;p
s;t = 
fqgs;tfpgs;t  fqgs;tfgs;t +

fpgs;t2
g
  
fpgs;tfgs;t
g
(23)
8This approximation holds better especially when  1 < x < 1 which is the CARA case in this paper where
x = gqgds and gross markups

given by gds = (1  gqgds) 1

are expected to be higher than 1.
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which corresponds to the following expression in the case of CARA:

fpgs;t2 = (g)2 fqgs;t2 + gs;t (24)
and the following expression in the case of CRRA:

fpgs;t2 =  gfqgs;tfpgs;t + gs;t (25)
where gs;t = 
gg;qs;t 
g;p
s;t . Di¤erent from Feenstra (1994) who considers relative prices and quantities
with respect to one country (i.e., Japan), we consider all independent source country pairs in our
estimation. Since quantities and prices are correlated with shocks of vg;s;t , v
g;w
s;t , and v
g;
s;t , then 
g
s;t is
correlated with the right hand side variables in Equations 25 and 24. Nevertheless, gs can still be
estimated consistently using instrumental-variable (IV) estimator, where instruments are source-
country and source-country-pair xed e¤ects (the latter is to capture the e¤ects due to considering
all independent source country pairs). We achieve this estimation at the good level.
4.3 Identication of Variables/Parameters
Once gs are estimated, we can identify marginal costs of production wgs;ts versus markups 
g
s;ts
using Equation 18, since we already have data for prices pgs;ts and trade costs 
g
s;ts. We can also
identify quality parameters of gs;ts as the residuals from estimating the following expressions for
CARA and CRRA, respectively:
qgs;t +
ln
 
pgs;t

g
=
0BBB@
Egt   1g
X
s0
ln

g
s0;t
pg
s0;t

pgs0;tX
s0
pgs0;t
1CCCA
| {z }
Good-and-Time-Fixed E¤ects
+
ln
 
gs;t

g| {z }
Quality
(26)
and
ln
 
qgs;t

+
ln
 
pgs;t

g
= ln
0@Egt
0@X
s0
 
gs0;t
 1
g 
pgs0;t
 1 g
g
1A 11A
| {z }
Good-and-Time-Fixed E¤ects
+
ln
 
gs;t

g| {z }
Quality
(27)
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where, for each expression, we run only one regression for the pooled sample.
Using pure quality data, Crozet et al. (2012) show that quality and marginal costs (as dened
in this paper) are positively related. Hence, in order to make sure that the residuals obtained from
estimating Equations 26 and 27 in fact represent the quality of imports, we can test their relation
according to the following specication:
logwgs;t = 
w
 log
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + log 
g
s;t (28)
where we control for several xed e¤ects as in Equation 1 (with the same notation and intuition).
In particular, if we can show that marginal costs are positively related to quality (i.e., c > 0), we
will have evidence for the residuals obtained from estimating Equations 26 and 27 representing the
quality of imports.
In Equation 28, it is important to emphasize that residuals of log gs;ts represent the part of (log)
marginal costs of production that cannot be explained by quality or any other xed e¤ects (including
country-time xed e¤ects capturing wages, exchange rates, etc.); therefore, we will consider gs;t as
a natural (inverse log) measure of productivity which is good-country-time specic.
4.4 Estimation Results
We start with depicting the estimation results for g, together with the implied price elasticities
of demand and markups, in Table 2, where all estimates are signicant at the 5% level.9 As is
evident, price elasticity of demand values are higher under CARA, while markups are higher under
CRRA. Compared to the existing literature, the distribution of estimated markups under CARA
are consistent with De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), who provide several estimates of markups
9The estimation results at the sectoral level are given in Table A in the Appendix, where the sector of "Arms and
Ammunition" ("Optical, Photographic Instruments") has the highest median/mean markup under the assumption
of variable (constant) markups.
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for Slovenian manufacturing plants ranging between 1.03 and 1.28.10
The estimation results regarding the relation between quality and marginal costs (i.e., Equation
28) are given in Table 3. Independent of the markup type, quality is positively related to marginal
costs of production. In the case of variable markups, the relation between marginal costs of produc-
tion and quality is almost one-to-one, while, in the case of constant markups, the relation is weaker
(although it is still statistically signicant). Hence, we have strong evidence for the validity our
measure of quality. In the existing literature, using pure quality data on French wine, Crozet et al.
(2012) have estimated the same relation with a coe¢ cient of 0.22; therefore, results with constant
markups are closer to their estimate, although our coe¢ cients represent the sample pooled across
goods and countries through time (rather than just French wine).
5 Pass-through of Trade Costs
In this section, we estimate the pass-through of trade costs to markups (only for the case of CARA),
to marginal costs of production, to quality, and to productivity. We also achieve a welfare analysis
to show the impacts of trade costs on welfare.
We start with estimating the pass-through of trade costs to variable markups according to:
log gs;t = 

 log 
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + 
g;
s;t (29)
where we control for several xed e¤ects as in Equation 1 (with the same notation and intuition);
the results are given in Table 4. As is evident, duties are positively related to markups (i.e., the
elasticity of markups with respect to trade costs  > 0), suggesting that more liberal trade leads
10The results are also in line with Yilmazkuday (2013) who estimate median variable (constant) markups of 1.04
(4:04) using a similar methodology but a di¤erent cross-country data set covering 4-digit SITC goods. Mandel
(2013) also nds signicant di¤erences across the cases of variable and constant markups where the median variable
(constant) markups are about 1.80 (7.60) across goods.
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to an increase in competition among exporters (i.e., pro-competitive e¤ects). However, the results
are the opposite for freight-related or overall-trade costs where lower trade costs are associated with
higher markups (i.e.,  < 0); hence, pro-competitive e¤ects of reduced trade costs disappear when
freight-related or overall trade costs are considered. This latter result also corresponds to lower
import competition (that the U.S. rms selling in the domestic market would benet from).
We continue with estimating the pass-through of trade costs to marginal costs according to:
logwgs;t = 
w
 log 
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + 
g;c
s;t (30)
for which the results are given in Table 5, where duties have no statistically signicant e¤ects (i.e.,
w = 0 statistically), under both variable and constant markups. However, freight-related costs
and overall trade costs (i.e., duties plus freight-related costs) both have negative e¤ects on marginal
costs (i.e., w < 0), suggesting that lower trade costs are associated with either higher quality
and/or lower productivity of goods imported. In order to distinguish between the e¤ects on quality
versus productivity, we rst test the e¤ects of trade costs on quality according to:
loggs;t = 

 log 
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + 
g;
s;t (31)
for which the results are given in Table 6. As is evident, duties are positively related to quality
(i.e.,  > 0), implying that more liberal trade reduces quality of the goods imported. Nevertheless,
freight-related costs and overall trade costs (i.e., duties plus freight-related costs) both have nega-
tive e¤ects on quality (i.e.,  < 0), which means that reduced trade costs attract higher quality
products. We also test the e¤ects of trade costs on inverse of productivity according to:
log gs;t = 

 log 
g
s;t + t + 
g + s + 
g
t + s;t + 
g;
s;t (32)
for which the results are given in Table 7 where trade costs (either duties and/or freight-related
costs) are negatively related to inverse of productivity (i.e.,  < 0), suggesting that a reduction in
trade costs would reduce productivity as well (since gs;t represents inverse of productivity).
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Although these results are intuitive on their own, what have we learned regarding the decompo-
sition of the e¤ects of trade costs on U.S. import prices (i.e., p in Equation 1)? We can answer this
question by considering the following total derivative decomposition of p into 

 and 
w
 (which is
an approximation, since total derivative considers small changes in variables) using Equations 18,
28, 29, 30, 31, and 32:
p|{z}
E¤ects of Trade Costs on Prices
 1|{z}
Direct E¤ect
+ |{z}
Markup E¤ects
+ w 

|{z}
Quality E¤ects
+ |{z}
Productivity E¤ects| {z }
Marginal Cost E¤ects (i.e., w )| {z }
Indirect E¤ects
(33)
where we have used the total derivative decomposition of w into 
w
 

 and 

 . For the calculation of
this decomposition, we already have the estimates of each parameter in our earlier tables; w is given
in Table 3,  is given in Table 6, and 

 is given in Table 7. We depict the contribution of each e¤ect
on prices in Table 8 for alternative measures of trade costs under variable and constant markups. As
is evident, the contribution of quality dominates in all cases, followed by the e¤ects of productivity;
markups (in the case of CARA) have relatively minor e¤ects. If we focus on the results based on
overall trade costs to have a basic summary of our results, under variable (constant) markups, 1%
of a reduction in trade costs has resulted in 0:90% of an increase in prices, 0:16% (0:00%) of an
increase in markups, 1:10% (1:20%) of an increase in quality, and 0:63% (0:70%) of a reduction in
productivity.
The results also show that the consideration of duties versus freight-related trade costs is im-
portant in forming optimal policy, since they have di¤erent e¤ects on the components of prices. In
particular, when trade is more liberal through reduced duties (i.e., a trade policy variable), markups
decrease (i.e., there are pro-competitive e¤ects when variable markups are considered) or remain
the same (when constant markups are considered), and marginal costs remain the same due to de-
creasing quality and increasing productivity cancelling each others e¤ects. However, when trade is
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facilitated through reduced freight-related costs, markups increase (i.e., there are anti-competitive
e¤ects when variable markups are considered) or remain the same (when constant markups are con-
sidered), and marginal costs increase due to both increasing quality and decreasing productivity.
Finally, when overall trade costs (i.e., duties plus freight-related costs) are considered, the e¤ects
of freight-related costs dominate those of duties while interpreting the results. Therefore, depend-
ing on the objective of the policy makers (e.g., pro-competitive e¤ects or higher-quality imports),
a balanced approach between reducing duties (through trade policy) and reducing freight-related
costs (through innovations in the freight/insurance sectors or the productivity in ports) should be
considered.
Regarding the welfare implications, if we accept the inverse of import prices controlled for quality
(i.e., the inverse of the price paid for the same quality of goods) as a rough measure of welfare, we
can write the elasticity of welfare with respect to trade costs as follows:
WELFARE| {z }
E¤ects of Trade Costs on Welfare
= w 

|{z}
Quality E¤ects
  p|{z}
E¤ects of Trade Costs on Prices
(34)
=  
0@ 1|{z}
Trade Costs
+ |{z}
Markups
+ |{z}
Productivity
1A
where 1% of a reduction in trade costs would correspond to a reduction of WELFARE percent
(equivalent to increase of
 
p   w 

= (1 +  + 

 ) percent) in welfare. Such welfare gains from
reducing trade costs are also given in Table 8, where, under variable (constant) markups, 1% of a
reduction in trade costs would result in 0:20% (0:30%) of an increase in welfare due to the reduction
in productivity and/or the increase in markups (only in the case of variable markups). When we
decompose trade costs into duties/tari¤s and freight-related costs, the e¤ects of a 1% reduction
in trade costs on welfare change as  0:21% (0:75%) for duties/tari¤s and as 0:25% (0:22%) for
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freight-related costs, under the assumption of variable (constant) markups.
Therefore, trade costs reductions are welfare improving (except for the value of  0:21%) where
freight-related costs play an important role in the pass-through of trade costs, which is mostly
ignored in the corresponding literature only focusing on duties/tari¤s. Nevertheless, from a trade-
policy perspective, which would mostly consider the policy variable of duties/tari¤s, welfare gains
from reducing trade costs can be negative ( 0:21%) under the assumption of variable markups
where, after 1% of a reduction in trade costs, the reduction in markups (i.e., 0:18%) would not be
enough to compensate for welfare losses due to the reduction in productivity (i.e., 1:33%).
6 Concluding Remarks
The important e¤ects of trade costs on export prices has been accepted and proven empirically in
the international trade literature. However, there has been a lack of attention on the similar e¤ects
on import prices, which is important for import competition and household/individual welfare in
the importer country. This paper is a rst attempt to ll this gap considering pass-through of
trade costs into U.S. import prices and their components at the most disaggregated good level,
where indirect e¤ects of trade costs through markups and marginal costs have shown to be playing
an important role. Robust to the consideration of variable versus constant markups, when the
e¤ects of trade costs on marginal costs are further decomposed into the e¤ects through quality,
productivity, and other factors, the contribution of quality dominates in all cases, followed by the
e¤ects of productivity; markups (in the case of variable markups) have relatively minor e¤ects.
The results also show that reduction in trade costs are mostly associated with welfare gains, with
the exception in the case of variable markups where duties/tari¤s are considered as the only measure
of trade costs. Accordingly, depending on the objective of the policy makers (e.g., pro-competitive
e¤ects or higher-quality imports), a balanced approach between reducing duties (through trade
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policy) and reducing freight-related costs (through innovations in the freight/insurance sectors or
the productivity in ports) should be considered. Nevertheless, since prices are a¤ected by both du-
ties/tari¤s and freight-related costs, the benchmark number that we consider out of our calculations
regarding welfare gains from reducing trade costs is about 0:20% (0:30%), under the assumption
of variable (constant) markups. Based on this result, we conclude that there is incomplete pass-
through of trade costs into welfare. The results are robust to the specication of trade costs
(e.g., multiplicative versus additive trade costs), because we use actual data on duties/tari¤s and
freight-related costs to construct multiplicative trade costs (which are convenient for pass-through
estimations in log-linear terms).
The results, however, are not without caveats. For instance, our calculation method of variable
markups (i.e., considering CARA utility functions) is one of the many methodologies covered in
Arkolakis et al. (2012). Although this may seem like a restrictive approach, it has come with
simplicity in empirical estimation. Since we consider a balanced panel to have a consistent compar-
ison across goods and source countries through time, our estimations ignore the e¤ects on prices
and welfare through the extensive margin (i.e., introduction of new goods); nevertheless, using
a balanced panel has made the results robust to the product replacement bias, similar to what
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) have shown in the context of price indexes. Finally, we have not
considered the pass-through of trade costs into other demographic data within the U.S., similar to
what Porto (2006), Nicita (2009), and Marchand (2012) have achieved for Argentina, Mexico, and
India, respectively; we leave this question for future research.
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Figure 1 - Distribution of Trade Costs paid on the U.S. Imports 
Log Duties across Goods and Countries 
 
Log Duties across Goods 
 
Log Duties across Countries 
 
Log CIF across Goods and Countries 
 
Log CIF across Goods 
 
Log CIF across Countries 
 
Log Duties plus CIF across Goods and Countries 
 
Log Duties plus CIF across Goods 
 
Log Duties plus CIF across Countries 
 
Notes: Both duties and CIF are in percentage terms (i.e., log(1+x), in particular). Sample only includes good-country pairs present in 1996 and 2012. Observations are 
demeaned by their time-average in 1996 to show their change over time. The values used to produce the second (third) column of figures have been obtained by 
taking the average across countries (goods). 
Table 1 - Pass-through of Trade Costs to Prices 
Dependent Variable: Log Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(1+Duties) 
1.21 
[0.41,2.01] 
  
1.13 
[0.34,1.93] 
     
log(1+CIF)  
-1.15 
[-1.45,-0.84] 
 
-1.13 
[-1.44,-0.83] 
     
log(1+Duties+CIF)   
-0.90 
[-1.12,-0.60] 
 
     
R-Squared 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 
     
Sample Size 18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
     
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Good Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Source Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
 
Table 2 – Estimation Results 
  Results with Variable Markups (CARA) Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
  410g   Price Elasticity of Demand Markup  g  Price Elasticity of Demand Markup  
Mean  1.50 171.55 1.07  0.62 1.82 3.64  
10th Percentile  0.01 6.13 1.00  0.36 1.17 1.56  
25th Percentile  0.02 13.89 1.01  0.47 1.28 1.88  
Median  0.06 40.89 1.03  0.61 1.64 2.57  
75th Percentile  0.31 135.96 1.08  0.78 2.14 4.52  
90th Percentile  2.56 422.13 1.20  0.85 2.80 6.89  
Notes: All estimates are significant at the 5% level. Estimates of 
g  under variable markups have been multiplied by 10,000 for presentational purposes. In order to 
give the reader an idea about the distribution of estimated parameters/variables across goods, the percentile values have been calculated after ranking each 
estimated variable individually. The estimation results at the sectoral level are given in Appendix Table A.2.  
 
Table 3 - Marginal Costs of Production and Quality/Taste 
Dependent Variable: Log Marginal Costs of Production 
 Results with Variable Markups (CARA)  Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
log(Quality/Taste) 
1.05 
[1.05,1.06] 
 
0.30 
[0.29,0.32] 
    
R-Squared 0.99  0.97 
    
Sample Size 18,360  18,360 
    
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES 
    
Good Fixed Effects YES  YES 
    
Source Fixed Effects YES  YES 
    
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES  YES 
    
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES  YES 
    
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Pass-through of Trade Costs to Variable Markups 
Dependent Variable: Log Variable Markups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(1+Duties) 
0.20 
[0.09,0.30] 
  
0.18 
[0.08,0.28] 
     
log(1+CIF)  
-0.20 
[-0.24,-0.16] 
 
-0.20 
[-0.24,-0.16] 
     
log(1+Duties+CIF)   
-0.16 
[-0.20,-0.12] 
 
     
R-Squared 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58 
     
Sample Size 18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
     
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Good Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Source Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
 
Table 5 - Pass-through of Trade Costs to Marginal Costs of Production 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Marginal Costs of Production 
 Results with Variable Markups (CARA) 
 
Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(1+Duties) 
0.14 
[-0.70,0.98] 
  
0.02 
[-0.82,0.85] 
 
0.33 
[-0.47,1.14] 
  
0.20 
[-0.60,1.00] 
          
log(1+CIF)  
-1.89 
[-2.21,-1.57] 
 
-1.89 
[-2.21,-1.57] 
 
 
-2.09 
[-2.40,-1.78] 
 
-2.09 
[-2.40,-1.78] 
          
log(1+Duties+CIF)   
-1.74 
[-2.06,-1.42] 
 
 
  
-1.90 
[-2.21,-1.60] 
 
     
 
    
R-Squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
          
Sample Size 18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
 
18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
          
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
 
Table 6 - Pass-through of Trade Costs to Quality/Taste 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Quality/Taste 
 Results with Variable Markups (CARA) 
 
Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(1+Duties) 
1.36 
[0.58,2.14] 
  
1.28 
[0.50,2.06] 
 
1.53 
[0.50,2.56] 
  
1.25 
[0.25,2.25] 
          
log(1+CIF)  
-1.33 
[-1.63,-1.03] 
 
-1.31 
[-1.61,-1.01] 
 
 
-4.46 
[-4.85,-4.07] 
 
-4.45 
[-1.61,-1.01] 
          
log(1+Duties+CIF)   
-1.05 
[-1.35,-0.75] 
 
 
  
-3.95 
[-4.33,-3.56] 
 
     
 
    
R-Squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
 
0.21 0.25 0.25 0.25 
          
Sample Size 18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
 
18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
          
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
Table 7 - Pass-through of Trade Costs to Inverse of Productivity 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Inverse of Productivity 
 Results with Variable Markups (CARA) 
 
Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(1+Duties) 
-1.30 
[-1.48,-1.11] 
  
-1.33 
[-1.51,-1.15] 
 
 -0.13 
[-0.88,0.61] 
  
-0.18 
 [-0.92,0.56] 
          
log(1+CIF)  
-0.49 
[-0.56,-0.42] 
 
-0.51 
[-0.58,-0.44] 
 
 
-0.73 
[-1.02,-0.45] 
 
-0.73 
[-1.02,-0.45] 
          
log(1+Duties+CIF)   
-0.63 
[-0.70,-0.57] 
 
 
  
-0.70 
[-0.98,-0.42] 
 
     
 
    
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
0.01 0. 01 0. 01 0. 01 
          
Sample Size 18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
 
18,360 18,360 18,360 18,360 
          
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Good and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Source and Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
          
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
Table 8 – Decomposition of Pass-through of Trade Costs to Prices 
 Results with Variable Markups (CARA)  Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
 log(1+Duties) log(1+CIF) log(1+Duties+CIF)  log(1+Duties) log(1+CIF) log(1+Duties+CIF) 
 1.13 -1.13 -0.90  1.13 -1.13 -0.90 
Contribution of:        
        
Trade Costs (Direct Effects) 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Markups 0.18 -0.20 -0.16  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Quality 1.35 -1.38 -1.10  0.38 -1.36 -1.20 
Inverse of Productivity -1.33 -0.51 -0.63  -0.18 -0.73 -0.70 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.07 -0.04 0.00  -0.07 -0.04 0.00 
        
        
        
Welfare Gains from  
Reducing Trade Costs 
-0.21 0.25 0.20  0.75 0.22 0.30 
        
        
Notes: Statistical discrepancy occurs due to ignoring either duties or freight-related costs, which are both supposed to be parts of prices with the same coefficient in 
the estimations; it  disappears when overall trade costs (i.e., duties plus freight-related costs) are considered.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Table A.1 – Descriptive Statistics on Trade Costs 
   Trade Costs in 1996  Trade Costs in 2012 
  Duties (%)  CIF (%)   Duties (%)   CIF (%) 
Sectors  Median Mean  Median Mean   Median Mean   Median Mean 
Live Animals, Animal Products  2.09 5.23  6.30 5.85   1.80 4.07   4.38 4.20 
Vegetable Products  1.34 1.61  5.02 6.89   0.71 1.21   2.83 7.78 
Animal or Vegetable Fats  4.01 4.01  5.41 5.41   12.69 12.69   5.38 5.38 
Prepared Foodstuffs  5.53 8.44  6.07 6.80   1.36 4.09   5.27 5.62 
Mineral Products  1.29 1.77  12.61 16.05   0.02 1.14   8.37 16.94 
Chemical or Allied Industries  4.59 6.02  3.00 4.11   3.64 3.72   3.24 4.08 
Plastics  4.97 6.10  7.09 11.99   4.78 5.34   8.74 11.30 
Raw Hides and Skins, Leather  14.64 11.42  8.55 13.83   3.92 8.38   8.67 9.39 
Pulp of Wood  3.34 2.40  6.46 7.08   0.00 0.00   5.51 7.39 
Textile and Textile Articles  8.06 10.06  5.29 6.78   6.86 7.17   6.87 9.13 
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas  4.88 4.75  4.51 8.21   4.88 3.91   3.86 6.26 
Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica  1.98 3.04  10.40 11.96   1.88 2.78   7.89 8.60 
Natural or Cultured Pearls  4.31 4.49  2.35 2.25   2.76 2.84   1.88 2.35 
Base Metals  3.73 3.95  4.05 5.92   0.52 2.14   2.92 3.55 
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances  2.27 2.81  3.04 3.95   1.39 2.02   2.56 3.01 
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels  2.30 2.02  2.53 4.53   0.00 0.90   2.92 3.81 
Optical, Photographic Instruments  2.47 3.46  1.51 1.70   0.00 1.34   1.93 2.56 
Arms and Ammunition  1.98 1.98  2.61 2.61   0.00 0.00   2.36 2.36 
               
Average  4.10 4.64  5.38 7.00   2.62 3.54   4.75 6.32 
Notes: The figures represent median/mean values across goods and source countries for each sector. Each sector represents a section as defined at 
http://hts.usitc.gov/.  
 
 
Appendix: Table A.2 – Sectoral Estimation Results 
  Results with Variable Markups (CARA)  Results with Constant Markups (CRRA) 
  510g    ,
g
s t   ,
g
s t   
g   ,
g
s t   ,
g
s t  
Sectors  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean 
Live Animals, Animal Products  0.05 0.17  22.20 60.73  1.05 1.11  0.49 0.55  2.06 2.04  1.94 3.34 
Vegetable Products  0.07 0.65  39.56 127.00  1.03 1.09  0.55 0.59  1.80 1.90  2.24 2.88 
Animal or Vegetable Fats  0.01 0.01  47.95 53.91  1.02 1.03  0.66 0.66  1.51 1.51  2.98 2.98 
Prepared Foodstuffs  0.16 0.35  22.86 116.39  1.05 1.10  0.58 0.57  1.72 2.02  2.38 2.70 
Mineral Products  5.11 14.91  31.23 125.43  1.03 1.10  0.50 0.49  1.99 2.28  2.01 2.20 
Chemical or Allied Industries  0.25 1.22  26.43 141.07  1.04 1.09  0.60 0.58  1.66 1.93  2.51 2.93 
Plastics  0.49 0.56  43.91 187.17  1.02 1.06  0.61 0.66  1.64 1.56  2.56 3.64 
Raw Hides and Skins, Leather  1.29 1.98  50.23 141.66  1.02 1.06  0.70 0.71  1.44 1.48  3.30 4.47 
Pulp of Wood  0.14 78.41  27.90 78.41  1.04 1.07  0.77 0.71  1.29 1.49  4.42 3.93 
Textile and Textile Articles  0.83 227.98  63.45 227.98  1.02 1.05  0.50 0.52  2.00 2.13  2.00 2.46 
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas  0.13 125.09  37.07 125.09  1.03 1.08  0.56 0.57  1.78 1.76  2.29 2.36 
Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica  2.36 143.75  34.15 143.75  1.03 1.08  0.82 0.76  1.22 1.34  5.63 5.09 
Natural or Cultured Pearls  0.73 70.98  33.97 70.98  1.03 1.05  0.72 0.76  1.39 1.33  3.58 4.23 
Base Metals  0.13 122.42  23.91 122.42  1.04 1.10  0.72 0.67  1.39 1.61  3.59 4.03 
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances  2.27 147.05  37.06 147.05  1.03 1.07  0.78 0.73  1.29 1.47  4.48 5.44 
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels  0.87 128.72  31.23 128.72  1.03 1.10  0.65 0.65  1.54 1.73  2.85 4.63 
Optical, Photographic Instruments  2.44 182.17  52.23 182.17  1.02 1.06  0.84 0.83  1.19 1.22  6.40 7.10 
Arms and Ammunition  1.87 26.96  18.91 26.96  1.06 1.12  0.63 0.63  1.59 1.59  2.71 2.71 
                   
Average  1.07 70.74  35.79 122.61  1.03 1.08  0.65 0.65  1.58 1.69  3.22 3.73 
Notes: The figures show median/mean values across goods, source countries, and time for each sector. Each sector represents a section as defined at 
http://hts.usitc.gov/. Estimates of g  under variable markups have been multiplied by 100,000 for presentational purposes.  
